Abstract-We test the hypothesis that information and communication technologies (ICT) polarize labor markets by increasing demand for the highly educated at the expense of the middle educated, with little effect on low-educated workers. Using data on the United States, Japan, and nine European countries from 1980 to 2004, we find that industries with faster ICT growth shifted demand from middle-educated workers to highly educated workers, consistent with ICT-based polarization. Trade openness is also associated with polarization, but this is not robust to controlling for R&D. Technologies account for up to a quarter of the growth in demand for highly educated workers.
and Manning (2007) describe a polarization of the workforce. In the United Kingdom, middle-skilled occupations have declined relative to both the high-skilled and low-skilled occupations. Spitz-Oener (2006) finds related results for Germany, and Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009) find similar results for almost all OECD countries. 2 What could account for these trends? One explanation is that new technologies, such as information and communication technologies (ICT), are complementary with human capital, and rapid falls in quality-adjusted ICT prices have therefore increased skill demand. A large body of literature is broadly consistent with this notion. 3 A more sophisticated view has been offered by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) who emphasize that ICT substitutes for routine tasks but complements nonroutine cognitive tasks.
Many routine tasks were traditionally performed by less educated workers, such as assembly workers in a car factory, and many of the cognitive nonroutine tasks are performed by more educated workers such as consultants, advertising executives, and physicians. However, many routine tasks are also performed in occupations employing middle-educated workers, such as bank clerks, and these groups have found demand for their services falling as a result of computerization. Similarly, many less educated workers are employed in nonroutine manual tasks such as janitors or cab drivers, and these tasks are much less affected by ICT. Since the number of routine jobs in the traditional manufacturing sectors (like car assembly) declined substantially in the 1970s, subsequent ICT growth may have primarily increased demand for highly educated workers at the expense of those in the middle of the educational distribution and left the least educated (mainly working in nonroutine manual jobs) largely unaffected.
Although this seems intuitive, we first corroborate the view that workers of different educational background cluster into occupations along the task-based view of the world. Using data from the U.S. Census and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, we show that the most educated workers do indeed disproportionately move into occupations that require relatively little routine cognitive or manual tasks. Middle-educated workers, by contrast are overrepresented in occupations that require routine tasks, especially cognitive ones. The least educated workers are in between when it comes to routine tasks; their work involves less nonroutine cognitive tasks than the others but more nonroutine manual tasks. The task-based theory predicts that ICT improvements increase demand for the most educated (complementing their nonroutine cognitive tasks), reduce demand for the middle educated (as it substitutes for routine tasks), and has ambiguous effects for the least educated.
There is currently little direct international evidence that ICT causes a substitution from middle-skilled workers to high-skilled workers. Autor et al. (2003) show some consistent trends, and Autor and Dorn (2009) exploit spatial variation across to show that the growth in low-skilled services has been faster in areas where initially there were high proportions of routine jobs. But these are solely within one country: the United States. 4 In this paper, we test the hypothesis that ICT may be behind the polarization of the labor market by implementing a simple test using 25 years of international cross-industry data. If the ICT-based explanation for polarization is correct, then we would expect that industries and countries that had a faster growth in ICT also experienced an increase in demand for college-educated workers, relative to workers with intermediate levels of education, with no clear effect on the least educated. We show that this is indeed a robust feature of the international data.
We exploit the new EUKLEMS database, which provides data on college graduates and disaggregates noncollege workers into two groups: those with low education and those with middle-level education. 5 For example, in the United States, the middle education group includes those with some college and high school graduates but excludes high school dropouts and GEDs (see Timmer et al., 2007, table 5.3 , for the countryspecific breakdown). The EUKLEMS database covers eleven developed economies (the United States, Japan, and nine countries in Western Europe) from 1980 to 2004 and also contains data on ICT capital. In analyzing the data, we consider not only the potential role of ICT but also several alternative explanations. In particular, we examine whether the role of trade in changing skill demand could have become more important in recent years (most of the early studies predated the growth of China and India as major exporters).
The idea behind our empirical strategy is that the rapid fall in quality-adjusted ICT prices will have a greater effect in some country-industry pairs that are more reliant on ICT. This is because some industries are (for technological reasons) inherently more reliant on ICT than others. We have no compelling natural experiment, however, so our results should be seen primarily as conditional correlations. We do, however, implement some instrumental variable strategies using the industry-specific initial levels of U.S. ICT intensity and routine tasks as an instrument for subsequent ICT 4 The closest antecedent of our paper is perhaps Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998, table V) who found that in the United States, the industry-level growth of demand for U.S. high school graduates between 1993 and 1979 was negatively correlated with the growth of computer use between 1993 and 1984. We find this is a robust feature of eleven OECD countries over a much longer time period. For other related work, see Black and SpitzOener (2010) and Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2011) , and work surveyed by Acemoglu and Autor (2010) . 5 In the paper we refer to the three skill groups as high skilled (or sometimes as the college group), middle skilled, and low skilled. increases in other countries (these are the sectors that stood to gain the most from the rapid fall of ICT prices). These support the OLS results. We conclude that technical change has raised relative demand for college-educated workers, and, consistent with the ICT-based polarization hypothesis, this increase has come mainly from reducing the relative demand for middle-skilled workers rather than low-skilled workers.
Our approach of using industry and education is complementary to the alternative approach of using occupations and their associated tasks. Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010) use wage and employment changes in occupations based on task content, for example, to show that routine occupations are in decline and that these are in the middle of the wage distribution. In order to examine ICT-based theories of polarization, however, we believe it is useful to have direct measures of ICT capital. Such data are not generally available for individuals consistently across countries and years, which is why using the EUKLEMS data is so valuable. As noted above, however, we do use the occupational information to confirm that educational groups cluster into routine and nonroutine tasks in a systematic way and to construct instrumental variables for the growth of ICT.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II describes the empirical model, section III the data, and section IV the empirical results. Section V offers some concluding comments.
II. Empirical Model
Consider the short-run variable cost function, CV (.):
where W indicates hourly wages and superscripts denote education or skill group S (H = highly educated workers, M = middle-educated workers, and L = low-educated workers), K = non-ICT capital services, C = ICT capital services, and Q = value added. If we assume that the capital stocks are quasi-fixed, factor prices are exogenous and that the cost function can be approximated by a second-order flexible functional form such as the translog, then cost minimization (using Shephard's lemma) implies the following three skill share equations:
where worked by skill group S. Our hypothesis of the ICT-based polarization theory is that α CH > 0 and α CM < 0 (with the sign of α CL being ambiguous). 6 Our empirical specifications are based on these equations. We assume that labor markets are national in scope and include country-by-year effects (φ jt ) to capture the relative wage terms. We also check that our results are robust to including industry-specific relative wages directly on the right-hand side of the share regressions. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity between industry-by-country pairs (η ij ) and include fixed effects to account for these, giving the following three equations:
where i = industry, j = country and t = year. We estimate in long (25-year) differences, Δ, to look at the historical trends and smooth out measurement error. We substitute levels rather than logarithms (Δ(C/Q) instead of Δ ln(C/Q)) because of the very large changes in ICT intensity over this time period. Some industry-by-country pairs had close to zero IT intensity in 1980, so their change is astronomical in logarithmic terms. 7 Consequently our three key estimating equations are
In the robustness tests, we also consider augmenting equation (6) in various ways. Since ICT is only one aspect of technical change, we also consider using research and development (R&D) expenditures. This is a more indirect measure of task-based technical change, but it has been used in the prior literature, so it could be an important omitted variable. Additionally, we consider trade variables (such as imports plus exports over value added) to test whether industries that were exposed to more trade upgraded the skills of their workforce at a more rapid rate than those that did not. This is a pragmatic empirical approach, to examining trade effects. Under a strict Heckscher-Ohlin approach, trade is a general equilibrium effect increasing wage inequality throughout the economy, so looking at the variation by industry would be uninformative. However, since trade costs have declined more rapidly in some sectors than others (for example, due to trade liberalization) we would expect the actual flows of trade to proxy this change and there to be a larger effect on workers in these sectors than in others who were less affected (Krugman, 2008 , also makes this argument).
Appendix A, found online, considers a theoretical model with parameter restrictions over equation (1) that implies that 6 The exact correspondence between the coefficients on the capital inputs and the Hicks-Allen elasticity of complementarity is more complex (see Brown & Christensen, 1981) . 7 The range of Δ ln(C/Q) lies between −1 and 23.5. We report robustness checks using
as an approximation for Δ ln(C/Q).
ICT is a substitute for middle-skilled labor and a complement with highly-skilled labor. Comparative static results from the model suggest that as ICT increases (caused by a fall in the quality-adjusted price of ICT), the wage bill share of skilled workers rises and the share of middle-skilled workers falls. It also shows that all else equal, an exogenous increase in the supply of middle-skilled workers will cause their wage bill share to rise. Thus, although ICT could reduce the demand for the middle-skilled group, their share could still rise because of the long-run increase in supply.
III. Data

A. Data Construction
The main source of data for this paper is the EUKLEMS data set, which contains data on value added, labor, capital, skills, and ICT for various industries in many developed countries (see Timmer et al., 2007) . The EUKLEMS data are constructed using data from each country's National Statistical Office (such as the U.S. Census Bureau) and harmonized with each country's national accounts. EUKLEMS contains some data on most OECD countries. But since we require data on skill composition, ICT, and non-ICT capital and value added between 1980 and 2004, our sample of countries is restricted to eleven: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 8 Another choice we had to make is about the set of industries we analyze. Since our baseline year (1980) was close to the peak of the oil boom, we have dropped energy-related sectors-mining and quarrying, coke manufactures, and the supply of natural gas-from the sample (we report results that are very robust to the inclusion of these sectors). The remaining sample includes twenty seven industries in each country (see appendix table A1). Wage data by skill category are reported only separately by industry in some countries. We therefore aggregate industries to the lowest possible level of aggregation for which all the variables we use could be constructed to have unique values for each industry. The precise level of disaggregation varied by country (see appendix table A2). 9 Our final sample has 208 observations on countryindustry cells for 1980 and 2004. We also have data for intervening years, which we use in some of the robustness checks.
For each country-industry-year cell in our data set, we construct a number of variables. Our main outcome is the wage bill share of workers of different educational groups, a standard indicator for skill demand. In nine of the eleven countries, the high-skilled group indicates whether an employee has attained a college degree. 10 A novel feature of our analysis is that we also consider the wage bill of middle-skilled workers. The precise composition of this group varies across countries, since educational systems differ considerably. But typically this group consists of high school graduates, people with some college education, and people with nonacademic professional degrees.
Our main measure for use of new technology is ICT capital divided by value added. Similarly, we also use the measure of non-ICT capital divided by value added. EUKLEMS builds these variables using the perpetual inventory method from the underlying investment flow data for several types of capital. For the tradable industries (agriculture and manufacturing), we construct measures of trade flows using UN COMTRADE data. 11 Details are contained in the online data appendix.
Finally, we construct measures of skill and task content by occupation. We begin with U.S. Census microdata for 1980 from IPUMS, which identify each person's education (which we aggregate to three skill levels using the EUKLEMS concordance for the United States) and occupation. We then use the "80-90" occupation classification from Autor et al. (2003) to add information on the task measures they construct. These include routine cognitive tasks (measured using set limits, tolerances, or standards); routine manual tasks (measured using finger dexterity); nonroutine manual tasks (measured using eye-hand-foot coordination); and nonroutine cognitive tasks measured using both (a) quantitative reasoning requirements and (b) direction, control, and planning. We standardize each of these five task measures by subtracting the mean task score across occupations, weighted by person weights, and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the measure across occupations. (For further details on the construction of these measures, see the data appendix.)
B. Descriptive Statistics
The routineness of occupations by skill level. We begin the description of the data by examining the relationship between education and tasks. Table 1 reports the top ten occupations for each of the three education categories using U.S. data for 1980. This table shows that the occupations with the largest shares of highly educated workers (such as physicians, lawyers, and teachers) and those with the highest shares of low-educated workers (such as cleaners and farmworkers) have low scores on routine cognitive tasks. These groups also have typically low scores on routine manual tasks. By contrast, occupations with high shares of middle-educated workers (mostly clerical occupations and bank tellers) typically score high on both routine cognitive and routine manual tasks. Therefore, if the only contribution 10 In two countries, the classification of high-skilled workers is different: in Denmark, it includes all people in "long-cycle" higher education, and in Finland it includes people with tertiary education or higher.
11 Using a crosswalk (available from the authors on request), we calculate the value of total trade, imports, and exports with the rest of the world and separately with OECD and non-OECD countries. We identify all thirty countries that were OECD members in 2007 as part of the OECD.
of ICT was to automate (and replace) routine tasks, it should benefit both high-skilled and low-skilled workers at the expense of middle-skilled workers.
However, as Autor et al. (2003) argued, information technology should also complement nonroutine tasks, especially cognitive ones. Here the picture is more nuanced: high-skilled occupations typically score high on nonroutine cognitive tasks, though not on nonroutine manual tasks. Middle-skilled occupations tend to score around average in nonroutine tasks, and low-skilled workers score low on nonroutine cognitive tasks but above average on nonroutine manual tasks. Therefore, to the extent that information technology both replaces routine tasks and complements nonroutine tasks, the overall picture suggests that ICT should increase the relative demand for high-skilled workers at the expense of middle-skilled workers, with no clear effect on low-skilled workers.
We further explore the relationship between education groups and tasks in table 2, which reports the average tasks content by skill group, again using 1980 U.S. data. On average, high-skilled occupations rank lowest in terms of routine tasks and nonroutine manual tasks, but highest in terms of nonroutine cognitive tasks, so the Autor et al. (2003) model suggests that they benefit from ICT improvements. Middleskilled occupations score above average on routine tasks and a little below average on nonroutine tasks, so ICT should probably reduce the relative demand for their services. Finally, the picture for low-skilled workers is once again mixed for both routine and nonroutine tasks, so the theory gives no clear prediction on how ICT improvements should affect the demand for their services.
Having discussed the relationship between skills and tasks, we now move on to describe the changes in skill demand using the EUKLEMS data.
Cross-country trends. Panel A of table 3 shows summary statistics for the levels of the key variables in 1980 across each country, and panel B presents the same for the changes through 2004. The levels have to be interpreted with care as exact comparison of qualifications between countries is difficult, which is why wage bill shares are useful summary measures as each qualification is weighted by its price (the wage). 12 The ranking of countries looks sensible, with the United States having the highest share of those which are highly skilled (29%), followed by Finland (27%). All countries have experienced significant skill upgrading as indicated by the growth in the high-skilled wage bill share in column 1 of panel B; on average, the share increased from 14.3% in 1980 to 24.3% in 2004.
The United Kingdom had the fastest absolute increase in the high-skilled wage bill share (16.5 percentage points) and is also the country with the largest increase in ICT intensity. The United States had the second-largest growth of ICT and the third-largest increase in the high-skilled wage bill 64 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
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This table reports the top ten occupations for each of the three skill categories, along with mean standardized task measures, using 1980 U.S. Census microdata and the occ8090 classification from Autor et al. (2003) . For each task measure, the standardized measure is derived by subtracting from each occupation's task score the weighted mean task score across all occupations, and then dividing the difference by the standard deviation of the task measure across the 453 occupations. This table reports the mean standardized task measures by skill group, using 1980 U.S. Census microdata and the occ8090 classification from Autor et al. (2003) . For each task measure, the standardized measure is derived by subtracting from each occupation's task score the weighted mean task score across all occupations, and then dividing the difference by the standard deviation of the task measure across the 453 occupations. share (13.9 percentage points), but all countries have experienced rapid increases in ICT intensity at the country level, which doubled its 1980 share of value added. Figure 1 shows the correlation between the growth of the wage bill share of each of the three education groups and ICT intensity. There appears to be a positive relationship for the highly educated (figure 1A), a negative relationship for the middle educated (figure 1B), and no relationship for the least educated ( figure  1C ). Although this is supportive of our model's predictions, there are many other unobservable influences at the country level; our econometric results below will focus on the within-country, across-industry variation. Returning to table 3, note that the change of the middle education share in column 2 is more uneven. Although the mean growth is positive, it is relatively small (8.7 percentage points on a base of 51.1%) compared to the highly educated, with several countries experiencing no growth or a decrease (the United States and the Netherlands). The model in appendix A shows how the wage bill share of the middle skilled could rise as the supply of this type of skill increases, so this supply increase can offset the fall in relative demand caused by technical change. Moreover, as figure 2A shows, although the wage bill share of the middle group rose more rapidly (in percentage point terms) between 1980 and 1986, it subsequently decelerated. Indeed, in the last six-year subperiod, 1998 to 2004, the wage bill share of middle-skilled workers actually fell. At the same time, the wage bill share of lowskilled workers continued to decline throughout the period 1980 to 2004, but at an increasingly slower rate. Figure 2B shows data for the United States, the technology leader that is often a future indicator for other nations. From 1998 to 2004 the wage bill share of the middle educated declined more rapidly than that of low-educated workers. Figure 2B is in line with the finding that while college-educated U.S. The figure plots the growth of high-, medium-, and low-skilled college wage bill shares against the growth of ICT intensity (ICT over value added) for eleven OECD countries (see table 3 ). Lines show regressions of the growth of each wage bill share against the growth of ICT intensity.
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workers continued to gain relative to high school graduates, high school graduates gained relative to college dropouts in the 1980s but not in the 1990s (see Autor et al., 2008 ; see also figure 5).
Cross-industry trends. Table 4 breaks down the data by industry. In levels (column 1) the highly educated were disproportionately clustered into services in both the public sector (especially education) and private sector (real estate and business services, for example). The industries that upgraded skills rapidly (column 8) were also mainly services (for example, finance, telecoms, and business services), but also in manufacturing (for example, chemicals and electrical equipment). At the other end of the skill distribution, the textile industry, which initially had the lowest wage bill share of skilled workers, upgraded somewhat more than other lowskill industries (transport and storage, construction, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture). This raises the issue of mean reversion, so we are careful to later show robustness tests to conditioning on the initial levels of the skill shares in our regressions. In fact, the ranking of industries in terms of skill intensity in 1980 and their skill upgrading over the next twenty-five years was quite similar across countries. This is striking, because the countries we analyze had different labor market regulations and different institutional experiences over the period we analyze. This suggests something fundamental is at play that cuts across different sets of institutions.
ICT grew dramatically from 1980 to 2004, accounting for more than 42% of the average increase in capital services (see columns 12 and 13). The increased ICT diffusion was also quite uneven: financial intermediation and telecoms experienced rapid increases in ICT intensity, while in other industries, such as agriculture, there was almost no increase. Figure 3A shows that the industries with the fastest ICT upgrading had the largest increase in the high-skilled wage bill share. One might be worried that two service sectors, post and telecommunications and financial intermediation, are driving this result, which is one reason Figure 3B drops all the nontraded sectors. In fact, the relationship between high-skilled wage bill growth and ICT growth is actually stronger in these well-measured sectors. Figure 4 repeats this analysis for the middle-educated groups. We observe the exact opposite relationship to figure 3: the industries with the faster ICT growth had the largest fall in the middle-skilled share whether we look at the whole economy (panel A) or just the traded sectors (panel B). Finally, figure 5 shows that there is essentially no relationship (panel A) or a mildly positive one (panel B) between the change of the share of the least educated and ICT growth.
These figures are highly suggestive of empirical support for the hypothesis that ICT polarizes the skill structure: increasing demand at the top, reducing demand in the middle, and having little effect at the bottom. To examine this link more rigorously, we now turn to the econometric analysis.
IV. Econometric Results
A. Basic Results
Our first set of results for the skill share regressions is reported in table 5. The dependent variables are changes from 1980 to 2004 in the wage bill share of the highly skilled in panel A, the middle skilled in panel B, and the low skilled in panel C. The first four columns look across the entire economy, and the last four columns condition on the subsample of tradable sectors where we have information on imports and exports.
Column 1 of panel A reports the coefficient on the constant, which indicates that on average, there was a 10 percentage point increase in the college wage bill share. This is a very large increase, considering that the average skill share in 1980 (across our sample of countries) was only 14%. Column 2 includes the growth in ICT capital intensity. The technology variable has a large, positive, and significant coefficient and reduces the regression constant to 8.7. Column 3 includes the growth of non-ICT capital intensity and value added. The coefficient on non-ICT capital is negative and insignificant, suggesting that there is no sign of (non-ICT) capital-skill complementarity. Some studies have found capital-skill complementarity (Griliches, 1969) , but few of these have disaggregated capital into its ICT and non-ICT components, so the evidence for capital-skill complementarity may be due to aggregating over high-tech capital that is complementary with skills and lower-tech capital that is not. The coefficient on value-added growth is positive and significant, suggesting that skill upgrading has been occurring more rapidly in the fastest-growing sectors (as in Berman, Somanathan, & Tan, 2005) . Column 4 includes country fixed effects. This is a demanding specification because the specification is already in differences, so it essentially allows for country-specific trends. The coefficient on ICT falls (from 65 to 47) but remains significant at conventional levels. 13 We reestimate these specifications for the tradable industries in the next four columns. Column 5 of table 5 shows 13 Including the mineral extraction sectors caused the ICT coefficient to fall from 47 to 45. We also tried including a set of industry dummies in column 4. All the variables became insignificant in this specification. This suggests that it is the same industries that are upgrading across countries.
that the overall increase in the college wage bill share from 1980 to 2004 was 9 percentage points-similar to that in the whole sample. Columns 6 to 8 add in our measure of ICT and other controls. The coefficient on ICT in the tradable sector is positive, highly significant, and larger than in the overall sample (for example, 129 in column 8).
Panel B of table 5 reports estimates for the same specifications as panel A, but this time the dependent variable is the share of middle-educated workers. The association between the change in middle-skilled workers and ICT is strongly negative. In column 4, for example, a 1 percentage point increase in ICT intensity is associated with a 0.8 percentage point fall in the proportion of middle-skilled workers. The absolute magnitude of the coefficients for the sample that includes all industries is quite similar to those for collegeeducated workers. Panel C shows that technology measures appear to be insignificant for the least educated workers, illustrating the point that the main role of ICT appears to be in changing demand between the high-skilled and middleskilled groups. 14 Since the adding-up requirement means that the coefficients for the least-skilled group can be deduced from the other two skill groups, we save space by omitting panel C in the rest of the tables.
Overall, table 5 shows a pattern of results consistent with ICT-based polarization. Industries where ICT grew most strongly were those with the largest shifts toward the most skilled and the largest shifts away from the middle skilled, with the least skilled largely unaffected.
B. Robustness and Extensions
Initial conditions. Table 6 examines some robustness checks using the results in our preferred specification of column 4 of table 5 (reproduced in the first column). Since there may be mean reversion, we include the level of initial share of skills in 1980 in column 2. This does not qualitatively alter the results, although the coefficient on ICT for the middle skilled does fall somewhat. 15 Timing of changes in skills and ICT. One limitation of the specifications that we have discussed so far is that the changes on the right-hand side and left-hand side are both concurrent. To mitigate potential concerns about reverse causation, we reestimate the baseline specification of column 1 in table 14 The difference in the importance of ICT for the middle and lowest skill groups implies that high school graduates are not perfect substitutes for college graduates as Card (2009) argues in the U.S. context. The majority of our data are from outside the United States, however, where there are relatively fewer high school graduates.
15 As we explain above, our specifications assume that markets are national in scope, so that country fixed effects capture changes in relative wages. To further test this assumption, we reestimated columns 1 and 2 in table 6 with additional controls for the change in the difference in industry-specific relative ln(wages) between the high skilled and middle skilled and between the high skilled and low skilled. The resulting coefficients (standard errors) on our measure of ICT are 41.43 (15.24) and 35.98 (14.82) for highly skilled workers, and −54.38 (20.96) and −33.35 (13.87) for middle-skilled workers. 6, where the right-hand-side variables are measured for the first half of the period we consider (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) and the lefthand-side variable is measured for the second half of the period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . The estimated coefficients (and standard errors) on changes in our measure of ICT are 52.62 (23.53) for highly skilled workers and −52.52 (28.97) for middleskilled workers. These results are almost unchanged-51.31 (22.65) and −58.22 (22.99) respectively)-when we instead use the equivalent of the specification in column 2 of table 6.
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Heterogeneity in the coefficients across countries. Wage inequality rose less in Continental Europe than elsewhere, so it is interesting to explore whether technological change induced polarization even there. Columns 3 and 4 of table 6 restrict the sample to the eight Continental European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain), and the results are similar to those in the full sample of countries. In column 5, we show that the correlation between ICT and polarization is larger for the United States than for the full sample, though column 6 shows that the estimates become imprecise when we control for baseline levels of skill composition. The sample size for most individual countries is rather small, but if we reestimate the specification of table 5, column 2 separately country by country, we obtain negative coefficients on ICT for all eleven countries for medium-skill shares and positive coefficients for ten countries for the high-skill shares (Japan is the single exception). 16 The results are also robust to dropping any single country. 17 Instrumental variables. One concern is that measurement error in the right-hand-side variables, especially our measure of ICT, causes attenuation bias. 18 To mitigate this concern, we use the industry-level measures of ICT in the United States in 1980 as an instrument for ICT upgrading over the whole sample. The intuition behind this instrument is that the dramatic global fall in quality-adjusted ICT prices since 1980 (Jorgenson, Ho, & Stiroh, 2008) disproportionately affects industries that (for exogenous technological reasons) have a greater potential for using ICT inputs. An indicator of this potential is the initial ICT intensity in the technological leader, the United States. As column 7 of table 6 shows, this instrument has a first-stage F-statistic of 10.5, and the sign of the first-stage regressions (not reported) is as we would 18 Estimates of the ICT coefficient for the two twelve-year subperiods of our data are typically about half of the absolute magnitude of those for the full period. In general, our estimates for shorter time periods are smaller and less precise, consistent with the importance of measurement error in the ICT data. For example, in the specification of column 4 of panel A in table 5, the coefficient (standard error) on ICT was 18.30 (10.30) in a pooled twelve-year regression. We could not reject the hypothesis that the ICT coefficient was stable over time ( p-value = 0.35). expect: that industries that were more ICT intensive in 1980 upgraded their use of ICT more than others. In the 2SLS estimates of column 7, the coefficient on ICT is roughly twice as large as the OLS coefficients for the college-educated group (and significant at the 5% level) and a little bigger for the middle-skilled group. Column 8 estimates the same specification but this time excluding the United States, and the results are very similar. While we acknowledge that estimates using this instrument do not necessarily uncover the causal effect of ICT, it is reassuring that these 2SLS estimates are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates, as we would expect given the likely measurement error.
As a further check, we use the proportion of routine tasks in the industry (in the United States in the base year) as an instrument for future ICT growth as these industries were most likely to be affected by falling ICT prices (see Autor & Dorn, 2009 ). The results of using this instrument are shown in columns 9 and 10. Although the first stages are weaker with this instrument 19 and the 2SLS estimates are not very precise, Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the 1980-2004 change in the Ln(relative wage bill); for example, in column 1, this is ln(wage bill of high-skilled workers) − ln(wage bill of medium-skilled workers). The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the change in Ln(relative hourly wage); for example in column 5 it is the ln(hourly wage of highly skilled) − ln(hourly wage of medium skilled). In columns 9-12, the dependent variable is the change in Ln(relative hours worked); for example, in column 9, this is ln(annual hours of highly skilled) − ln(annual hours of medium skilled). Coefficients estimated by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by the industry's 1980 share of each country's employment.
these columns again suggest that we are not overestimating the importance of ICT by just using OLS.
Disaggregating the wage bill into wages and hours. The wage bill share of each skill group reflects its hourly wage and hours worked and those of the other skill groups. We estimated specifications that are identical to those in table 5, except that they disaggregate the dependent variable into the growth of relative skill prices (wages) and quantities (hours). In the first two columns of table 7, we reproduce the baseline specifications using the log relative wage bill (which can be exactly decomposed) as the dependent variable. 20 Columns 1 to 4 confirm what we have already seen using a slightly different functional form: ICT growth is associated with a significant increase in the demand for highly skilled workers relative to middle-skilled workers (first two columns) and with a significant (but smaller) increase for low-skilled workers relative to middle-skilled workers (third and fourth columns).
For the high-versus middle-skill group, ICT growth is significantly associated with increases in relative wages and relative hours (columns 5, 6, 9, and 10) . In comparing the middle versus low groups, we see that the coefficients are also all correctly signed, but not significant at conventional levels. Overall this suggests that our results are robust to functional form and the shifting pattern of demand operates through both wages and hours worked. 21
C. Trade, R&D, and Skill Upgrading
Having found that technology upgrading is associated with substitution of college-educated workers for middle-educated 20 Another functional form check was using the growth rate of ICT intensity. For the specification in column 3 of panel A in table 5, we replaced Δ(C/Q) with
. The coefficient (standard error) on ICT growth was 2.586 (1.020). The marginal effect of a 1 standard deviation increase (0.581) is 1.50 (= 0.581 × 2.586), almost identical to 1.55 (= 0.024 × 64.6) in table 5. 21 In examining these results across countries, we found some evidence that the adjustment in wages was stronger in the United States and the adjustment in hours was stronger in Continental Europe. This is consistent with the idea of great wage flexibility in the United States than in Europe.
workers, we now examine whether changes in trade exhibit similar patterns. The first three columns of table 8 suggest that more trade openness (measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to value added) is associated with increases in the wage bill share of college-educated workers and declines in the share for middle-skilled workers. However, when we control for initial R&D intensity, the association between trade and skill upgrading becomes smaller and insignificant. Column 4 repeats the specification of column 3 for the subsample where we have R&D data and shows that the trade coefficient is robust. Column 5 includes R&D intensity in a simple specification and shows that the coefficient on trade falls (say, from 0.50 to 0.24 in panel A) and is insignificant, whereas the coefficient on R&D is positive and significant. In column 6, we include the changes in the ICT and non-ICT, and the coefficient on trade is now very small. Column 7 drops the insignificant trade variable and shows that ICT and R&D are individually (and jointly) significant.
We also used the Feenstra and Hanson (1996) method of constructing an offshoring variable and included it instead of (and alongside) trade in final goods. The offshoring variable has a bit more explanatory power than final goods trade. 22 Column 8 includes offshoring ("Imported Intermediate Inputs" into the full sample as it can be defined for all industries. The results suggest a significant positive correlation between offshoring for high-skilled workers and a negative but insignificant correlation between ICT and demand for middle-skilled workers. Column 9 produces a similar result on the sample of tradable sectors, and column 10 includes ICT and R&D. As with the trade measure in final goods, the offshoring coefficient is insignificant in the final column for both education groups. The ICT effects are robust to the inclusion of the offshoring measures. Coefficients estimated by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted by the industry's 1980 share of each country's employment, for traded goods (columns 1-7) and for all goods (column 8). The OECD ANBERD data set does not have R&D data for Austria and Spain, which are dropped from the sample (columns 4-7). In column 8, we construct the imported intermediate inputs measure by using the 1987 Input/Output Tables for the United States, and taking the product of the relative use by each industry of all commodities and the ratio of Total Imports to Apparent Consumption (Output + Imports − Exports) of each industry.
These findings are broadly consistent with most of the literature that finds that technology variables have more explanatory power than trade in these kinds of skill demand equations. 23 Of course, trade could be influencing skill demand through affecting the incentives to innovate and adopt new technologies, which is why trade ceases to be important after we condition on technology (Bloom, Draca, & Van Reenen, 2011 , argue in favor of this trade-induced technical change hypothesis). 24 Furthermore, there could be many general equilibrium effects of trade that we have not 23 These are simple industry-level correlations and not general equilibrium calculations, so we may be missing out the role of trade through other routes. 24 We further test whether the association between trade and skill upgrading remains similar when we examine different components of trade separately. Table A3 suggests that when we examine imports and exports separately, the picture is quite similar. Greater trade is associated with an increase in the college wage bill share until we control for initial R&D accounted for (these are controlled for by the country time effects).
D. Magnitudes
We perform some back-of-the-envelope calculations (see table A4 ) to gauge the magnitude of the effect of technology on the demand for highly-skilled workers. Column 1 estimates that ICT accounts for 13.2% of the increase in the college share in the whole sample without controls and intensity, in which case the coefficient on trade falls and becomes insignificant. Results are similar when we separately analyze imports to (or exports from) OECD countries. For non-OECD countries, the results are again the same, except for exports to non-OECD countries, which remains positively associated with changes in the college wage bill share even after we add all the controls, including R&D. However, it should be noted that the change in exports to developing countries is on average very small.
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column 2 reduces this to 8.5% with controls. Many authors (for example, Jorgenson, et al., 2008) have argued that valueadded growth has been strongly affected by ICT growth, especially in the later period, so column 2 probably underestimates the effect of ICT. Column 3 reports equivalent calculations for the tradable sectors. Here, ICT accounts for 16.5% of the change and R&D a further 16.1%, suggesting that observable technology measures account for almost a third of the increase in demand for highly skilled workers. If we include controls in column 4, this falls to 23.1%. Finally, columns 5 and 6 report results for the IV specification for the whole sample, showing an ICT contribution of ICT of between 22.1% and 27.7%. 25 We also note that ICT upgrading alone should have led to decreased demand for middle-skilled workers. While we do not see such a decrease overall, figure 2 shows a slowdown in the growth of demand for the middle skilled over time and a reversal (in other words negative growth) for middle-skilled workers from 1998 to 2004.
We have no general equilibrium model, so these are only back-of-the-envelope calculations to give an idea of magnitudes. Furthermore, measurement error probably means that we are underestimating the importance of the variables. Nevertheless, it seems that our measures of technology are important in explaining a significant proportion of the increase in demand for college-educated workers at the expense of the middle skilled.
V. Conclusion
Recent investigations into the changing demand for skills in OECD countries have found some evidence for polarization in the labor market in the sense that workers in the middle of the wage and skills distribution appear to have fared more poorly than those at the bottom and the top. One explanation that has been advanced for this is that ICT has complemented nonroutine cognitive tasks but substituted for routine tasks while not affecting nonroutine manual tasks (like cleaning, gardening, and child care). This implies that many middleskilled groups like bank clerks and paralegals performing routine tasks have suffered a fall in demand. To test this, we have estimated industry-level skill share equations distinguishing three education groups and related this to ICT (and R&D) investments in eleven countries over 25 years using newly available data. Our findings are supportive of the ICTbased polarization hypothesis: industries that experienced the fastest growth in ICT also experienced the fastest growth in the demand for the most educated workers and the fastest falls in demand for workers with intermediate levels of education. The magnitudes are nontrivial: technical change can account for up to a quarter of the growth of the college wage 25 The IV specifications for tradables show an even larger magnitude. For example, in a specification with full controls, R&D and ICT combined account for over half of all the change in the college wage bill share. The first stage for the IV is weak, however; with an F-statistic of 6, these cannot be relied on.
bill share in the economy as a whole (and more in the tradable sectors).
Although our method is simple and transparent, there are many extensions that need to be made. First, alternative instrumental variables for ICT would help identify the causal impact of ICT. Second, although we find no direct role for trade variables, there may be other ways in which globalization influences the labor market, for example, by causing firms to "defensively innovate" (Acemoglu, 2003) . Third, there are alternative explanations for the improved performance of the least-skilled group through, for example, greater demand from richer-skilled workers for the services they provide as market production substitutes for household production (such as child care, restaurants wait staff, domestic work). 26 These explanations may complement the mechanism that we address here. Finally, we have not used richer occupational data that would focus on the skill content of tasks due to the need to have international comparability across countries. The work of Autor and Dorn (2009) is an important contribution here. 26 See Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Mazzolari and Ragusa (2008) . 
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